Theaetetus

​SOCRATES: Let us follow the recent argument, positing that nothing is one itself by itself. And thus black and white and any other color will appear to us to have been generated from the impact of the eyes upon the appropriate motion, and that which we say each color is will be neither the impacting thing nor the impacted thing, but something generated in between, which is peculiar to each individual. Or would you strongly maintain that as each color appears to you, so it also appears to a dog or any other animal? THEAETETUS: By Zeus, not I. SOCRATES: And what of this? Does anything appear similar to another human being as it does to you? Do you hold this firmly, or rather that it does not even appear the same to yourself, because you are never in the same state as yourself? THEAETETUS: The latter seems to me more likely than the former. SOCRATES: Therefore, if that against which we measure ourselves or which we touch were large or white or hot, it would never, by coming into contact with something else, have become different, while it itself underwent no change. And if, on the other hand, the thing measuring or touching were each of these, then when something else approached it or was affected in some way, it would not, while itself undergoing no affection, have become different. For as it is, my friend, we are somehow easily forced to say things that are wonderful and ridiculous, as Protagoras and anyone who attempts to say the same things as he would assert. THEAETETUS: How so, and what kind of things do you mean? SOCRATES: Take a small example, and you will know everything I mean. For instance, if you bring four dice near six dice, we say that the six are more than the four and are one and a half times as many; but if you bring twelve, they are fewer and half, and it is not even tolerable to say otherwise. Or would you tolerate it? THEAETETUS: Not I, indeed. SOCRATES: What then? If Protagoras or someone else should ask you: “Theaetetus, is there any way that anything becomes larger or more otherwise than by being increased?” What will you answer? THEAETETUS: If, Socrates, I answer what seems true in response to this present question, I should say “No, there is not”; but if I answer with regard to the former case, guarding against saying contradictory things, I should say “Yes, there is.” SOCRATES: Well said, by Hera, my friend, and divinely! But, as it seems, if you answer that there is, something Euripidean will happen: for our tongue will be unrefuted, but our mind will not be unrefuted. THEAETETUS: True. SOCRATES: Therefore, if you and I were clever and wise, having thoroughly examined all the things of the mind, then for the rest, out of sheer abundance, we would try to test each other, and coming together in a sophistical manner into such a battle, we would clash each other’s arguments with arguments. But as it is, since we are ordinary people, we shall first want to inspect our thoughts themselves in relation to themselves, to see what they actually are, and whether they agree with one another or not at all. THEAETETUS: I would indeed wish this very much.