- Source
- Platonis Opera, Tomus I: Tetralogia I-II. Burnet, John, 1863-1928, editor. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1905.
- Translation
- AI-generated (gemini-3.5-flash) — machine translation; may contain errors
- Languages
- 日本語 · English · 简体中文 · 한국어
- CTS URN
- urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg002.humanitext-grc2:27
- Generated
- Humanitext Reader · reader.humanitext.ai · 2026-10-27
Socrates points out that Meletus's indictment contains a self-contradictory riddle, claiming that Socrates does not believe in gods but does believe in them. He argues that since Meletus charges him with believing in spiritual affairs, he must necessarily believe in spiritual beings, which are themselves either gods or the children of gods.
ἔοικεν γὰρ ὥσπερ αἴνιγμα συντιθέντι διαπειρωμένῳ1 ἆρα γνώσεται Σωκράτης ὁ σοφὸς δὴ ἐμοῦ χαριεντιζομένου καὶ ἐναντίʼ ἐμαυτῷ λέγοντος, ἢ ἐξαπατήσω αὐτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς ἀκούοντας; οὗτος γὰρ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται τὰ ἐναντία λέγειν αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ εἴποι· ἀδικεῖ Σωκράτης θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων, ἀλλὰ θεοὺς νομίζων. καίτοι τοῦτό ἐστι παίζοντος.2συνεπισκέψασθε δή, ὦ ἄνδρες, ᾗ μοι φαίνεται ταῦτα λέγειν· σὺ δὲ ἡμῖν ἀπόκριναι, ὦ Μέλητε. ὑμεῖς δέ, ὅπερ κατʼ ἀρχὰς ὑμᾶς παρῃτησάμην, μέμνησθέ μοι μὴ θορυβεῖν ἐὰν ἐν τῷ εἰωθότι τρόπῳ τοὺς λόγους ποιῶμαι.ἔστιν ὅστις ἀνθρώπων, ὦ Μέλητε, ἀνθρώπεια μὲν νομίζει πράγματʼ εἶναι, ἀνθρώπους δὲ οὐ νομίζει; ἀποκρινέσθω, ὦ ἄνδρες, καὶ μὴ ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλα θορυβείτω· ἔσθʼ ὅστις ἵππους μὲν οὐ νομίζει, ἱππικὰ δὲ πράγματα; ἢ αὐλητὰς μὲν οὐ νομίζει εἶναι, αὐλητικὰ δὲ πράγματα; οὐκ ἔστιν, ὦ ἄριστε ἀνδρῶν· εἰ μὴ σὺ βούλει ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἐγὼ σοὶ λέγω καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τουτοισί. ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ γε ἀπόκριναι· ἔσθʼ ὅστις δαιμόνια μὲν νομίζει πράγματʼ εἶναι, δαίμονας δὲ οὐ νομίζει;οὐκ ἔστιν.ὡς ὤνησας ὅτι μόγις ἀπεκρίνω ὑπὸ τουτωνὶ ἀναγκαζόμενος. οὐκοῦν δαιμόνια μὲν φῄς με καὶ νομίζειν καὶ διδάσκειν, εἴτʼ οὖν καινὰ εἴτε παλαιά, ἀλλʼ οὖν δαιμόνιά γε νομίζω κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον, καὶ ταῦτα καὶ διωμόσω ἐν τῇ ἀντιγραφῇ. εἰ δὲ δαιμόνια νομίζω, καὶ δαίμονας δήπου πολλὴ ἀνάγκη νομίζειν μέ ἐστιν· οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει; ἔχει δή· τίθημι γάρ σε ὁμολογοῦντα, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἀποκρίνῃ. τοὺς δὲ δαίμονας οὐχὶ ἤτοι θεούς γε ἡγούμεθα ἢ θεῶν παῖδας; φῂς ἢ οὔ;πάνυ γε.οὐκοῦν εἴπερ δαίμονας ἡγοῦμαι, ὡς σὺ φῄς, εἰ μὲν θεοί τινές εἰσιν οἱ δαίμονες, τοῦτʼ ἂν εἴη ὃ ἐγώ φημί σε αἰνίττεσθαι3 καὶ χαριεντίζεσθαι, θεοὺς οὐχ ἡγούμενον φάναι με θεοὺς αὖ ἡγεῖσθαι πάλιν, ἐπειδήπερ γε δαίμονας ἡγοῦμαι· εἰ δʼ αὖ οἱ δαίμονες θεῶν παῖδές εἰσιν νόθοι τινὲς ἢ ἐκ νυμφῶν ἢ ἔκ τινων ἄλλων ὧν δὴ καὶ λέγονται, τίς ἂν ἀνθρώπων θεῶν μὲν παῖδας ἡγοῖτο εἶναι, θεοὺς δὲ μή; ὁμοίως γὰρ ἂν ἄτοπον εἴη ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις4 ἵππων μὲν παῖδας ἡγοῖτο ἢ καὶ ὄνων, τοὺς ἡμιόνους, ἵππους δὲ καὶ ὄνους μὴ ἡγοῖτο εἶναι. ἀλλʼ, ὦ Μέλητε, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως σὺ ταῦτα οὐχὶ ἀποπειρώμενος ἡμῶν ἐγράψω τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην ἢ ἀπορῶν ὅτι ἐγκαλοῖς ἐμοὶ ἀληθὲς ἀδίκημα· ὅπως δὲ σύ τινα πείθοις ἂν καὶ σμικρὸν νοῦν ἔχοντα ἀνθρώπων, ὡς οὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἔστιν καὶ δαιμόνια καὶ θεῖα ἡγεῖσθαι, καὶ αὖ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μήτε δαίμονας μήτε θεοὺς μήτε ἥρωας, οὐδεμία μηχανή ἐστιν.
For he seems to be like one who is composing a riddle and testing me: ‘Will Socrates, the wise man indeed, realize that I am joking and contradicting myself, or shall I deceive him and the other listeners?’ For this man seems to me to be saying contradictory things to himself in the indictment, as if he were to say: ‘Socrates is guilty of not believing in gods, but believing in gods.’ And yet this is the behavior of one who is playing. Join me, gentlemen, in examining how he seems to me to say this; and you, Meletus, answer us. And you, as I requested of you at the beginning, remember for my sake not to make a disturbance if I make my arguments in my accustomed manner. Is there anyone among men, Meletus, who believes that human affairs exist, but does not believe that humans exist? Let him answer, gentlemen, and not make a disturbance in one way or another. Is there anyone who does not believe that horses exist, but believes that equestrian affairs exist? Or who does not believe that flute-players exist, but believes that flute-playing affairs exist? There is not, most excellent of men; if you do not wish to answer, I will tell you and these others here. But at least answer the next question: Is there anyone who believes that spiritual affairs exist, but does not believe that spiritual beings exist? There is not. How helpful it is that you have answered, even if reluctantly, under compulsion by these men! Well then, you say that I both believe in and teach spiritual affairs, whether they are new or old; at any rate, I believe in spiritual affairs according to your statement, and you also swore to this in your indictment. But if I believe in spiritual affairs, it is absolutely necessary that I also believe in spiritual beings, is it not? It is so; for I assume that you agree, since you do not answer. And do we not think that spiritual beings are either gods or the children of gods? Do you say so or not? Most certainly. Therefore, if indeed I believe in spiritual beings, as you say, if the spiritual beings are some kind of gods, this would be what I say you are riddling and joking about, when you say that I, who do not believe in gods, believe in gods again, since indeed I believe in spiritual beings. But if, on the other hand, the spiritual beings are children of gods, some kind of bastards born of nymphs or of some others of whom indeed they are said to be born, what human being would believe that children of gods exist, but that gods do not? For it would be just as absurd as if someone believed that the children of horses or asses—namely, mules—exist, but did not believe that horses and asses exist. But, Meletus, there is no way that you did not write this indictment either to test us or because you were at a loss for any true wrongdoing to charge me with. But that you could persuade anyone who has even a little intellect that it does not belong to the same person to believe in both spiritual and divine things, and on the other hand to believe in neither spiritual beings nor gods nor heroes, is utterly impossible.
- 27aσυντιθέντι διαπειρωμένῳ
Dative participles acting as the complement of the verb ἔοικεν ('he seems like'). They modify an implied third-person singular pronoun referring to Meletus, describing him as one who composes riddles and tests Socrates.
- 27aπαίζοντος
Genitive singular of the present participle. It functions as a possessive or characteristic genitive ('it belongs to or is characteristic of one who plays'), describing the playful nature of the accusation.
- 27dτοῦτʼ ἂν εἴη ὃ ἐγώ φημί σε αἰνίττεσθαι
The relative pronoun ὅ refers back to the demonstrative pronoun τοῦτο and serves as the direct object of the accusative-and-infinitive construction σε αἰνίττεσθαι, which is governed by φημί ('I say').
- 27eὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις
The formulaic expression ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ (or ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις) introduces a hypothetical condition with an elliptical apodosis containing ἂν. It expresses a comparison based on a counterfactual or potential scenario ('just as if someone were to believe...').