On Organization

​On the other hand, the private houses of those who rose to power were so modest and in keeping with the character of the constitution, that if any of you happens to know what the house of Themistocles, of Cimon, of Aristides, or of any other of the illustrious men of that time was like, he sees that it is not at all more stately than that of their neighbor.

​But now, O men of Athens, in public matters our city is content with constructing roads, fountains, whitewashed walls, and trifles (and I do not blame those who introduced these things, far from it, but rather you, if you assume that these things are sufficient for yourselves); while in private, of those who have had some charge of public affairs, some have constructed private houses more stately than public buildings, and more arrogant than those of the common people, while others have bought up and are farming more land than they ever dreamed of even in a dream.

​And the cause of all these things is that then the people were the master and lord of all, and it was a desirable thing for each of the others to receive from them a share of honor, office, or some benefit; but now, on the contrary, these men are the masters of all benefits, and through them everything is transacted, while the people are in the position of a servant and an appendage, and you are content to receive whatever they may share with you.

​Consequently, from these things the affairs of the city are in such a state that if anyone were to read your decrees and then go through your actions in order, not a single person would believe that the former and the latter belonged to the same people. For example, what you voted against the accursed Megarians who were cutting off the sacred pasture land: to go out, to prevent them, and not to permit it; and what you voted in favor of the Phliasians when they were exiled recently: to assist them, not to abandon them to their slaughterers, and to summon those in the Peloponnese who wished to help.

​All these things, O men of Athens, are noble, just, and worthy of the city; but the actions resulting from them are nowhere to be seen. Therefore, you express your hostility through your decrees, but you become masters of none of the actions; for you pass decrees in accordance with the dignity of the city, but you do not possess the power corresponding to what you vote.

​And I would advise you (and please do not be angry with me at all) either to think less of yourselves and be content with doing your own affairs, or to prepare a greater power. If, then, I knew that you were like the Siphnians or the Cythnians or any other such people, I would advise you to think less of yourselves; but since you are Athenians, I exhort you to prepare your power; for it is shameful, O men of Athens, shameful to abandon that rank of spirit which your ancestors handed down to you.

​Moreover, it is not even in your power to withdraw from Greek affairs, even if you should wish to do so; for many things have been done by you throughout all time, and it is shameful to abandon your existing friends, while it is impossible to trust those who are your enemies and allow them to become great. In short, the very situation which the politicians have experienced in relation to you—that it is not possible for them to retire when they wish—has also encompassed you; for you have engaged in politics among the Greeks.

​And the sum of all that has been said, O men of Athens, is this: speakers never make you either bad or good, but you make them whichever you wish; for you do not aim at what they want, but they aim at what they think you desire. You, therefore, must begin by desiring what is good, and all will be well; for either no one will say anything worthless, or it will be of no advantage to him since he has no one who will be persuaded.